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I. Introduction
In this paper, I intend to bridge a gap in the scholarship on The Cloud of
Unknowing. Multiple theories have been put forth on the use of imagery and creative
language in The Cloud. While all of these theories have shed some light on how
language is used in The Cloud of Unknowing, I feel that something is missing in that
while some of these readings directly relate the way imagery is used to the central fact
that The Cloud is a work of apophatic theology, few of them relate these things in a way
that extends to a theology of language that applies past the pages of The Cloud; none
of them elaborate on the ways in which the ramifications of their theory of language
would affect the apophatic understanding of Christ as The Word of God. This paper
attempts to put forth a theology of language as used by the author of The Cloud of
Unknowing that both explains the images he uses and the way he does so, and which
can also be applied as a more general view of language that naturally flows from the
apophatic theology of The Cloud. This will also take into account how this view of
language would affect the understanding of Christ as the incarnate Word, and show that
what I propose is consistent with the authorʼs understanding of Christ.
To do this I first outline the method of negative theology in The Cloud authorʼs
translation Deonise Hid Diuinite, which functions as my basis for explaining the authorʼs
method of using imagery (I.1). The second section summarizes the method and
purpose of contemplation as put forth in The Cloud, which is a direct application of the
apophatic theology of Deonise Hid Diuinity (I.2). A preliminary discussion of the role of
Christ (I.3), and the role of language (I.4) in The Cloud of Unknowing, as well as a
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review of past scholarship on these issues, follows. After discussing the theories that
have already been put forth, I move into my explanation of what The Cloud author is
doing with his creative use of language (II). The proposed language theory is then
applied to the authorʼs understanding of Christ as The Word (III), which is followed by
some concluding remarks (IV).

1. The Method of Negative Theology in Deonise Hid Diuinite
Written in the late fourteenth century, The Cloud of Unknowing is an anonymous
Middle English work of Christian mysticism from the apophatic tradition. Apophatic
theology, also known as negative theology or via negativa, is a theological approach
that attempts to define God in terms of negation. Its opposite is cataphatic, or affirmative
theology. Affirmative theology defines God by what God is and does: God is good, God
is merciful, or God exists, God was angry, God spoke. To the apophatic tradition
speaking of The Divine in this manner is limiting. God is so far above what humans
understand as good, or existent, that these words can not appropriately be applied to
The Divine. To describe God as angry or speaking words is all a form of
anthropomorphizing The Divine.
Before addressing the particular approach of The Cloud, which is essentially a
guide to contemplation, it will be helpful to take a more general look at the apophatic
mindset as found in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius. Pseudo-Dionysius, or Denis as The
Cloud author calls him1, was a Christian writer who epitomizes Christian platonism and

1

In the Middle Ages there was a conflation between the author Pseudo-Dionysius, who at the time was
believed to be the actual Dionysius that the Apostle Paul converted, and Saint Denis of France. But the
author of these works was neither the convert of Paul, nor the French saint.
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apophatic theology. His works were highly influential on the author of The Cloud; he is
one of the few authorities that the author refers to in The Cloud.2 In addition to invoking
the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, The Cloud author also translated his work De
Mystica Theologia, which is The Cloud authorʼs Deonise Hid Diuinite. Why Denis Hid
Divinity is so important to understanding The Cloud of Unknowing is clear from its
introduction, where The Cloud author states:
Þis writyng þat next foloweþ is þe Inglische of a book þat Seynte Denys
wrote vnto Thimothe, þe whiche is clepid in Latyn tonge Mistica Theologia.
Of þe whiche book, for-þi þat it is mad minde in þe 70 chapter of a book
wretin before (þe whiche is clepid Þe Cloude of Vnknowing) how þat Denis
sentence wol cleerli afferme al þat is wretyn in þat same book” (2).
The theology in the Mystical Theology will confirm the method of The Cloud. It is for this
reason that I will first examine what the Mystical Theology has to say about negative
theology in general, before going into the details of The Cloud; the method set forth in
Deonise Hid Diuinity will be integral later in this paper.
In chapter III of The Mystical Theology Pseudo-Dionysius describes the methods
of affirmative and negative theology, and how he has used both of these methods in his
works.3 In his Ierarchies of Heuen, and Ierarchies of þis Fiʒtyng Chirche PseudoDionysius claims to have affirmed the orthodox doctrines of the oneness of God, as well

2
3

Ch. 70. the only other authors referred to are Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa for The Life of Moses.

Some of the works Dionysius mentions are either lost or fictitious. I will refer to them by the names The
Cloud author gives them, but I want to include a list of how they relate to a modern translation of their
names. The author splits what Pseudo-Dionysius calls The Theological Representations (lost/fictitious)
into the Ierarchies of Heuen (The Celestial Hierarchy) and the Ierarchies of þis Fiʒtyng Chirche (The
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy). Goddes Names directly corresponds to the extant work called The Divine
Names. And lastly the lost/fictitious Symbolic Theology is referred to as the Gadering of Deuine Sentence.
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as the equality and single substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the Trinity.
He addresses “how þat þe souereyn-substancyal Jhesu is maad substaunce in þe
trewþes of mankynde ; and alle oþer soche þinges þat ben expressid in þe Scripture,
ben affermyngliche preisid in þoo two bookes” (7). The Divine Names affirms how God
can be named “Good, how Beyng, how Liif, how wisdome, & how Vertewe, & what oþer
þat þei be of þe vnderstondable namynges of God” (7). These works deal primarily with
major doctrinal issues, and conventional names for God. But the next work mentioned is
perhaps the most antithetical to the apophatic tradition, though it is also the work that I
will argue the imagery in The Cloud resembles most (and least). Deonise Hid Diuinite
reads:
Bot in þe book of þe Gadering of Deuine Sentence, þere I haue
affermyngliche set wiþ preising alle þe names þat ben applied vnto God
from þees sensible þinges–as whiche ben þe godliche fourmes, whiche
ben þe godliche figures, whiche ben his partiees & his instrumentes, when
ben his places & his enournementes, whiche ben his frenesiees & his
heuinesses, which ben his woodenesses & his dronkenesses, whiche ben
his gloteniees & his oþes & his cursynges, which ben his slepinges &
whiche ben his wakynges–& what oþer sensible formes þat on any maner
in Holy Scripture ben applied vnto God (7).
From these works Pseudo-Dionysius explains two important things about cataphatic
theology. First, it works on a hierarchy; when attributing things to God, one first starts
with those things that are most godlike. One begins with Godʼs singularity, or goodness,
or the Trinity, and moves down into what are referred to as ʻthe sensible thingsʼ, such as
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Godʼs physical place, or oaths. Secondly, the further down a person travels in this
hierarchy, the more numerous the predications are. If anthropomorphically God can be
said to be such disparate things as asleep, drunk, or in a particular place, then it is hard
to imagine very many things that can not, in this extremely figurative sense, be said of
The Divine.
But the Mystical Theology is a negative work, and goes against both of these
aspects of affirmative theology. As The Cloud author translates:
And ʒif we wolen merk hym by doing away of alle vnderstondable þings, it
acordeþ moost þat we first do away þoo þinges, þe whiche be seen to be
moost fer from hym. As þus: more niʒ & more acordyng vnto hym is liif or
goodness þen is ayer or a stone ; and wiþ more acordyng euydence we
schuld do awey from hym glotenye & woodnes, þan spekyng or
vnderstondyng. And ʒit he in hymself is abouen boþe alle spekyng and
alle vndersondyng (8).
While in affirmative theology one starts by affirming those worthy things that are most
like the divine, in negative theology one must work from the bottom up, denying first
those sensible things that are least like God. It even seems that there are two types of
denial occurring here. Gluttony and insanity seem to be improper for The Divine, and
are therefore attributed purely in a non-literal sense. But for speaking, understanding,
goodness, and life, it is not that God exhibits nothing like these qualities so much as that
the way they are exhibited in The Divine is so far above the way humanity exhibits
them, and above what words can portray. Therefore, they must be denied due to their
insufficiency.
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In addition to descending from that which is high to that which is base, cataphatic
theology also grows in what can be attributed to God. Negative theology does the
opposite; Deonise Hid Diuinity differentiates itself from Pseudo-Dionysiusʼs affirmative
works in this way:
As it is now here in þis book, whan we entren into þe derkness þat is
abouen mynde, we schul not onliche fynde þe schortyng of wordes, bot as it
were a madnes & a parfite vnresonabiltee of alle þat we seyn. And in alle þe
oþer bookes oure enditing descendid fro þe heiʒest þinges to þe lowest ;
and after þe quantitee of descendyng, it spred oute to a greet multitude. Bot
now it ascendiþ in þis book fro þe lowest þinges to þe hiʒest ; and after þe
mesure of þe ascencioun–þe whiche is somtyme sodeyner þen oþer–it is
maad streite. And after alle soche assencioun, it schal al be withouten voice,
& al it schal be knitted to a þing þat is vnspekable (8).
Thus we make the transition from the negative theology set forth in the Mystical
Theology to the practical guide of contemplation, The Cloud of Unknowing. As one
ascends, denying all things that are predicated of God, one reaches a point where there
is nothing left to deny, and nothing that can be said, and one is alone with The Divine.

2. The Cloudʼs Approach to Approaching the Divine
The Cloud author takes the negative approach to God and applies its
ramifications to contemplation. I say its ramifications because nowhere in The Cloud of
Unknowing does he directly outline negative theology (hence my reliance on Deonise
Hid Diuinity thus far); although he does directly accept and put forward the idea that
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God is beyond what we can understand. The author begins with a description of four
progressive degrees of Christian living: the common, special, singular, and perfect. The
common degree is living in the world, and being concerned with bodily things. The
special degree is a calling to live more like Christ, and serve his servants, with a
concern for the spiritual things of life. The singular life is described as that “In þe whiche
solitari forme & maner of leuying þou maist lerne to lift up þe fote of þi loue, & step
towardes þat state & degree of leuyng þat is parfite, & þe laste state of alle” (14). The
author states that “Þre of þeese mow be bigonnen & eendid in þis liif ; & þe ferþe may bi
grace be bigonnen here, bot it schal euer laste wiþ-outen eende in þe blis of
heuen” (13). The Cloud is written for those that feel they have been called to the
singular life, and would like to approach the perfect life of contemplation which will not
die with the body, but continue in heaven. The degrees of the Christian life are not
referred to outside of the first few chapters, but in these few chapters they are used as a
calling into the contemplative life, and into The Cloud of Unknowing.
The first three chapters set forth the goal and basic method proposed in the
work. After going through the degrees of Christian living and establishing that the
readers (granted they are part of his strictly defined target audience) are being called to
a higher service of God, the author describes the new relationship that one should be
yearning for: “Bot oo þing I telle þee: he is a gelous louer & suffreþ no felawship, & him
list not worche in þi wille bot ʒif he be only wiþ þee bi hym-self” (15). This is the goal of
the singular life, on the way to the perfect life: to be alone with God, and only God.
Although the author does not make a direct connection, it is easy to see how the
degrees of Christian living translate over into his descriptions of the active and

8

contemplative lives. The author relies on the active and contemplative differentiation
throughout the text. Rather than just dividing these into two separate types of living, the
author creates a three step process from the active and contemplative lives, and he
uses Christʼs saying from the story of Mary and Martha as a justification.4 When
Martha–representative of active life–asks Jesus to make Mary–representative of
contemplative life–help her with physical service, Jesus tells Martha that Mary has
chosen the best part. The author argues “Where-so-euer þe best is set or nemnyd, it
askeþ bifore it þeese two þinges: a good & a beter ; so þat it be þe best, and þe þryd in
noumbre” (53). The author solves the number problem between the three things implied
by the word “best”, and the two types of living, active and contemplative, by describing a
third part in between the active and contemplative lives, which is the second part of the
active life and simultaneously the first part of the contemplative life. These can be
directly related to the degrees of Christian living: the common being the first part of the
active life, the special being the second part of the active life in which one first takes
part in contemplation. As one becomes more involved in contemplation and less in the
active life one passes into the singular form of living. Lastly, when one is wholly in the
contemplative life, one lives in the perfect degree. In seeking to enter from the singular
to the perfect life, one seeks to leave behind the active life and enter more fully into the
contemplative life. The second chapter ends with the author spurring the reader to get
on with the work, and asking the logical question of anyone looking to begin the
contemplative life: “Bot what schalt þou do, & how schalt þou put ?” (16).

4

Lk 10:38-42.
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Answering this question is the main point of The Cloud: if one is being called to
contemplation, how is one to proceed? How does one enter into contemplative prayer?
The author exhorts the reader to:
Lift up þin herte vnto God wiþ a meek steryng of loue ; & mene him-self, &
none of his goodes. … so þat nouʒt worche in þi witte ne in þi wille bot
only him-self. & do þat in þee is to forʒete alle þe creatures þat euer God
maad & þe werkes of hem, so þat þi þouʒt ne þi desire be not directe ne
streche to any of hem, neiþer in general ne in special (16).
The Cloud of Unknowing proposes that one approaches God in this manner, lifting oneʼs
heart to God in a meek stirring of love, and willing nothing other than Godʼs self and not
any divine attributes or creation. At this point, the connection to negative theology may
seem insubstantial, but in this description the two things essential to The Cloudʼs
methods are present. First, one is to be alone with God, and only will to love God. This
is the ascent that is spoken of in Deonise Hid Diuinity, which ends with unity and
solitude with The Divine after denying everything else. The authorʼs statement of being
alone with God may not seem quite that negative, but it becomes more clear as we
move into the things that one should forget during this work. Not much later in the work
the author clarifies that absolutely everything should be forgotten when contemplating
The Divine. This means not only everything on earth, but everything in Heaven; holy
things such as as the angels and the saints must be forgotten. But the true nature of the
negation can be seen more clearly when the author insists that the reader forget even
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the works of God:
For þof al it be good to þink apon þe kindenes of God, & to loue hym &
preise him for hem: ʒit it is fer betyr to þink apon þe nakid beyng oh him, &
to loue him & preise him for him-self (25 II. 9-12).
The contemplative is to love God, not for Godʼs kindness, or mercy, or the good things
God has done, but to love Godʼs self. If this leaves the reader asking what in the world
that is supposed to mean, then things are going well, for the author immediately follows
with this:
Bot now þou askest me & seiest: ʻHow shal I þink on him-self, & what is
hee ?ʼ & to þis I cannot answere þee bot þus: ʻI wote neuer.ʼ … For alle
oþer creatures & theire werkes–ʒe, & of þe werkes of God self–may a
man þorou grace haue fulheed of knowing, & wel to kon þinke on hem ;
bot of God him-self can no man þinke. & þerfore I wole leue al þat þing þat
I can þink, & chese to my loue, but not þouʒt. By loue may he be getyn &
holden ; bot bi þouʒt neiþer. & þerfore, þof al it be good sumtyme to þink
of the kyndnes & þe worþines of God in special, & þof al it be a liʒt & a
party of contemplacion : neuerþeles in þis werk it scahl be casten down
and keuerid wiþ a cloud of forʒetyng (25-26).
Loving Godʼs self is the essence of contemplation in The Cloud. God can not be known
with the intellect, but can be embraced by oneʼs ability to love. Godʼs creation can be
known, even specific divine works can be known, but Godʼs self is beyond what we can
understood. the goal of The Cloud of Unknowing is that one should approach God with
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oneʼs love, a naked intent towards God, and be so enthralled in The Divine that
everything else–including anything in particular about God–is forgotten.
As I am finishing my overview of The Cloudʼs methods, there is a point that I
want to make sure I bring out, since the author is very careful about it. The goal of this
work is to enter into contemplation, which is the highest form of living, and best way that
one can be connected with God. However, even as this method is the highest form of
living, the author is clear that he has no disdain for those that do not take part in it, and
are in the first part of the active life. Nor does he have anything against thinking about
God in affirmative terms. As the passage above states “it be good sumtyme to þink of
the kyndnes & þe worþines of God in special, & þof al it be a liʒt & a party of
contemplacion”. Thinking of these things is good, it is simply not a part of the work that
the author has set out to teach.

3. Knowing and The God-man
When considering Christian doctrine a possible problem with the method and
theology of The Cloud becomes apparent. We can know bodily things, creatures, and
even the works of God, but supposedly we can not know Godʼs self. In many religions
this likely would pose no problem, but in Christianity one may rightfully wonder what role
Christ plays in all of this? If God is ever knowable, it is in Jesus Christ, the God-man,
the Word made flesh; if one can comprehend the works of God, and one can
understand bodily truths, then why doesnʼt the Incarnation make the very being of God
knowable? The Incarnation seems like it should be a central concern to the author,
either because it makes God known to us in the flesh, or because he must explain why
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this is not the case, and why even by looking at Christ one can not truly know God. But
The Cloud remains remarkably silent on this point.
The role (or lack thereof) of Christ and the Incarnation in The Cloud has been
noticed by others. Commenting on the fissure that must exist between God and creation
in the negative theology of The Cloud, A. C. Spearing writes:
It may be hard to see how such beliefs could be compatible with
Christianity itself, and especially with its central doctrine of the incarnation:
if God became man, taking on human language as well as human flesh,
how can this absolute incapacity of human language exist? (xviii).
Spearing notes that The Cloud allows for contemplation of the Incarnation and Passion,
but only in the early stages of the contemplative life. Spearing explains that this feature
of The Cloud is consistent with the English mystic tradition of writers such as Richard
Rolle or Julian of Norwich, albeit The Cloud author takes his avoidance of material
devotion further than the other mystics. Spearing leaves the subject saying that The
Cloud author “was not accused of heresy, but at times you can feel him struggling to
hold on to orthodoxy” (xx). While The Cloudʼs consistency with other mystics of the time
is important, pointing it out does not really address the issue of Christʼs role in the work.
And while there are parts of The Cloud where the authorʼs clarifications that earthly
things are not bad seem anxious, and perhaps even paranoid, this is more to protect the
reader from an unorthodox interpretation of The Cloud rather than representing a
struggle with orthodoxy that is internal to the author.
In Mysticism of The Cloud of Unknowing William Johnston closely examines
Christʼs place in The Cloud, and rightfully points out that Christ does play an important

13

role through his divinity. According to Johnston, the humanity of Christ is included in
what is forgotten in the contemplative act, while one continues to concentrate on the
person of Christ because of his divinity. This is directly in line with the teaching of The
Cloud through the story of Mary and Martha, which is such a central image of the work.
In a passage considering this event, The Cloud author comments that while sitting at
the feet of Jesus, Mary was fully fixed on the divinity of Christ rather than his body:
ʒi! & ful oftymes I hope þat sche was so deeply affecte in þe loue of his
Godheed þat sche had bot riʒt lityl specyal beholdyng unto þe beute of his
precious & his blessid body, in þe whiche he sate ful louely, spekyng &
preching before hir ; ne ʒit to anyþing elles, bodyly or goostly (46).
Johnston comments on this passage that “Through the humanity of Christ (which is
present, though forgotten) she contemplates His divinity” (74). While Christ plays an
integral role in Maryʼs contemplation, Johnston notices an important but subtle
difference:
[Maryʼs] forgetting of the humanity of Christ is quite different from the
forgetting of other creatures. It would seem that Mary is making no
deliberate attempt to forget the sacred humanity; she is not vigorously
“treading it down beneath the cloud of forgetting” as is done with other
creatures; it is rather that she is so fascinated and absorbed by the
Divinity that the beauty of His Humanity falls into the background (75).
Thus, while Christ is fully man and fully God, and his humanity is absolutely essential for
salvation, and his human nature is inseparable though distinct from his divine nature,
his humanity is not what one seeks in the contemplative work. It can not be left aside
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like other bodily things, because Christ and his humanity, as the second person of the
Trinity, is part of The Divine. However, one can still justify leaving the humanity of Christ
behind to focus on the divinity, because in apophatic contemplation one does not pay
attention to any particulars about God, which would here presumably include his
humanity. Thus there is good reason to strive to be so enthralled with the divine nature
of Christ that one leaves behind contemplation of Christʼs human nature. Johnston
summarizes an image from The Cloud authorʼs other work, Privy Counseling, in support
of this point:
In another passage, the author shows that he has mastered the theology
underlying his spiritual direction. Our Lord, he says, is one Person; by His
manhood He is the door, and by His Godhead He is the porter; in order to
reach the porter one must pass through the door–and moreover, there is
no other way in (73).
Thus Johnston points out that the humanity of Christ is the means by which we find
Christʼs divinity. While I agree with this without question, it leads to the point on which
my view diverges from Johnstonʼs.
Johnston notes that “the assertion [has been] made that The Cloud is theocentric
rather than Christocentric” (67). This, however, is a viewpoint that Johnston disagrees
with. In his Introduction to his modern translation of The Cloud and Privy Counceling,
Johnston states his view more explicitly when commenting on the problematic place of
Christ in the imageless ideal of negative theology: “yet, I believe that the author of The
Cloud can truly be called Christocentric” (14). Borrowing terminology from Teilhard de
Chardin, Johnston specifies that The Cloud is centered on the ʻcosmic Christʼ, or the

15

risen and living Christ. The cosmic Christ is the same as the historical person, but he
has, Johnston says, a different existence. As opposed to the historical Christ, the
cosmic Christ can not be imagined and is “co-extensive with the universe”. This Christ
that one can interact with is the Christ that Johnston believes The Cloud centers on.
Johnstonʼs argument climaxes with his comment on a prayer in Privy Counseling:
This is truly the peak-point when the contemplative together with Christ
offers himself to the Father for the human race. Now he has put on the
mind of Christ so completely that, in a sense, only the Father remains. It is
Christ who prays and offers himself to The Father–“I live, now not I, but
Christ liveth in me.” (18).
My first issue with this comment is that in the prayer5 Johnston is commenting on I see
nothing that indicates any such intimate connection with Christ. Christ has not been
mentioned by name at all before this point of Privy Counseling, but only alluded to in
relating the story of the sick woman seeking to touch Christʼs cloak. Outside of that
there has only been reference to God, with no specific mention of any trinitarian
distinctions, much less a joining with Christ in prayer as a form of approach to the
Father. What Johnston is describing is something more traditional and conventional
than the mysticism of The Cloud. Granted, it is tradition that The Cloud author would
likely have no qualms with, but it is not the contemplative work that The Cloud strives
for. These distinctions between Christ, and approaching only the Father, are artifacts of
Johnstonʼs theory of the place of Christ in The Cloud corpus. But The Cloud author

5

The prayer can be found on page 141 of the Hodgson text, and page 144 of Johnstonʼs.
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shows little interest in the trinitarian distinctions; they too must be transcended in the
contemplative work.
Contrary to Johnston, I believe that The Cloud is theocentric as opposed to
Christocentric, and that as a work of negative theology it is necessarily so. The Cloud is
seeking a union with God as a whole where the distinctions of the Trinity bleed away
and one is left only with The Divine. Which isnʼt to say those distinctions arenʼt real, or
that The Cloud author rejects them, but only that such things are not what this form of
contemplation is concerned with. This is evident as The Cloud author says that we can
know things like the works of God, “bot of God him-self can no man þinke” (26). Thus
we can know things like the Incarnation, or what persons make up the Trinity, but these
are not Godʼs self, and thus not what the contemplative is seeking to love. The divinity
of Christ is strictly the Son, as orthodoxy teaches that only the Son was made incarnate
in the person of Jesus. But the Son is only one person of the Trinity, and has made
union with the Father possible, while sending the Sprit after his ascension to remain
with his followers. To be Christocentric, and solely centered on the divinity of Christ,
would lead to a theology centered on the person of the Son within the Trinity. Christ
does play a central role, but it is because he provides access to The Divine as a whole;
the humanity of Christ is not what the contemplative is searching for, but it is what
makes the search possible. Nor is the contemplative looking only for that divinity that
was made incarnate in Christ–the Son–but is looking for union with the entirety of the
Godhead.
The God-man has bridged the divide between God and humanity. But in doing so
he has not made God knowable (if anything has been made knowable it is strictly the
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humanity of Christ, his divinity is still transcendent), but rather, he has made humanity
able to reach God with love when one sits at the feet of Christ, as Mary did, and looks
past the human, and into The Divine. God, who is humanityʼs shepherd, spoke, through
Jesus as the Word made flesh, but we hear the Word in order to return to the shepherd,
not to dwell on the sound–or as it were the body–of the Word that was spoken.

4. Speaking the Ineffable
Christ, as the Word, is a divine speech act; he is also called the image of the
invisible God.6 Any cogent Christian theology of language must account for this divine
metaphor of Christ as the Word. The connection between Christ and language will
inform one about both a theory of language because words are like Christ, as well as
the role of Christ because he is like words. Having established the place of Christ in The
Cloud, a review of the scholarship on the authorʼs use of imagery is in order; particularly
three important essays concerning language use in The Cloud of Unknowing: “Of
Another Mind: Ludic Imagery and Spiritual Doctrine in the Cloud of Unknowing” by
Robert Englert; “Paradox upon Paradox: Using and Abusing Language in The Cloud of
Unknowing and Related Texts” by Cheryl Taylor; and “Fantasy and Language in The
Cloud of Unknowing” by J. A. Burrow.
I will begin with Englertʼs “Of Another Mind”. The strength of Englertʼs article is
that it is very organic; he is not attempting to compare two independent ideas, one being
imagery and the other being the apophatic theology of The Cloud, but he is “interested
in interaction, and in the creative process which allows symbols/images and ideas to

6

Col 1:15
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assume religious form” (3). As the title of the article suggests, Englert centers on the
specific idea of playful images, and proposes that the author uses them in a playful
manner. Central to Englertʼs argument is that The Cloud is unself-conscious, or in other
words, that “The Cloud of Unknowing was a spontaneous search and not a planned or
contrived project” (3). Englert then connects this with The Cloud authorʼs affinity for play,
and associating his work with play:
Play, too, is an unself-conscious activity that calls for spontaneity and
imagination rather than for order and objectivity. It is in the spirit of play,
therefore, that the author makes a game of his teaching, plays with us
rather than teaches us, and gives expression to the gameful style that is in
part his message (4).
It is through the idea of play that Englert argues that The Cloud author is teaching a
game rather than doctrine. I agree with this to an extent, which is why I had to rely on
Deonise Hid Diuinite which is more theologically oriented for an explanation of negative
theology, and then outline the particular application of the apophatic tradition used in
The Cloud. Because the author is trying to teach the contemplative how to approach
God with love rather than through objective facts about God, the system (if it can be
called a system) has to be dynamic and something that the contemplative can react to
and which can react to the contemplative. I do not doubt that there is something like
playfulness in the images that Englert points out. One such example he gives is The
Cloud authorʼs exhortation to hide oneʼs desire from God:
In Chapter Fourty-Six the reader encounters the Dionysian game of hiding
by which the author is captivated. Here one is told to hide his desire from
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God, not to be rude or boisterous in prayer, but subtle. The disciple should
hide until God find him, elude all pretense of discovering God until finally
God discover him. … If such advice appears cold, one soon learns that
the coldness is part of a flirtation which invites a response. … The author
eases any misapprehension when he tells us that he who hides from God
comes to “fele (God) gamesumli pley with him as the fadir doth with the
childe, kyssing & clippyng (hugging)” (5).
This method of hiding oneʼs desire from God is remarkably like a game. Approaching it
from any other way seems detrimental; what would it mean for a contemplative to
seriously and defensively hide desire from God? If it were serious, then to be ʻfoundʼ
would be to suffer a sort of loss; however, The Cloud author clearly intends the finding
event to be like an earthly father “kyssing & clippyng” his child rather than a serious
hiding.
Englertʼs goal is to do more than merely point out images of play, and state that
they are playful. Englert comes to this thought:
Our conclusion is that the authorʼs spiritual letter is not to be taken
“seriously.” It is certainly not to be designated a spiritual doctrine. Rather, it
assumes the guise of a game whose images appeal to “nakid entent” (10).
There are two problems with this conclusion. The first is that, while certain parts of The
Cloud are playful, there are others that are certainly not part of a game and are very
serious. In the prologue the author strictly confines his readership to Christians that are
fully dedicated to Christ and the possibility of following him into contemplation. To
anyone who would read The Cloud the author writes “I beseche þee bi þe autorite of
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charite” to read the entire work. Furthermore, before embarking on contemplation the
author exhorts that the contemplative must have confessed his or her sins, as is the
“ordinaunce of alle Holy Chirche” (43). Under the reading of The Cloud as a work of
play these things could perhaps be justified as ʻthe rules of the gameʼ, but other parts of
The Cloud are more problematic, like the authorʼs warning against false contemplatives
in chapters fifty-one through fifty-six. When the author says of the false contemplative,
“Now trewly I trowe þat who þat wil not goo þe streyte wey to heuen þat þei schul goo
þe softe wey to helle” (104), I am inclined to say that, while play certainly has a part in
The Cloud, the overall theme and goal is in fact very serious.
Reading the entire work as playful is a problem that stems from the other issue in
Englertʼs conclusion that The Cloud “assumes the guise of a game whose images
appeal to ʻnakid ententʼ”. Here the idea of the authorʼs images being part of a game is
expanded to all of the images of The Cloud. But as The Cloud is not wholly a game, not
all of its images are part of a game, nor are all of them playful. It is for this reason that
Englertʼs theory seems too specific to be expanded into a theory of how images are
used in The Cloud; though he certainly succeeds in giving a wonderful interpretation of
what the specifically playful images mean in The Cloud. Since playfulness does not
apply to all the imagery in The Cloud–the central images of a cloud of unknowing and a
cloud of forgetting, as well as the biblical image often used of Mary sitting at Jesusʼs
feet are in no way playful–this theory fails to give a justification for the use of these other
images in a theology that seeks to avoid imagery.
Cheryl Taylor provides a theory uniting all of the imagery of The Cloud as
paradoxical in “Pardox upon Paradox: Using and Abusing Language in The Cloud of
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Unkowing and related texts”. Taylor proposes that The Cloud author has developed “a
language that in some respects imitates and embodies his contemplative methods” (31).
Taylor proposes that The Cloud author does this through constrictions in language,
which “function as textual imitations of the effort made in the authorʼs contemplation by
unknowing” (33). I agree that image usage in The Cloud reflects the authorʼs negative
approach, but my explanation differs from Taylorʼs. Taylor writes of the authorʼs use of
imagery:
Long preemptive rebuttals of misconceptions constrict semantic
possibilities more and more, before the text expands into brief but
powerful positive formulations. The paradigm is established in
explanations at the end of Chapter 4 that the cloud and darkness are not
physical and so are not accessible to the imagination. These lead to
assertions: ʻwhen I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng…[sic]& for
þis skile it is not clepid a cloud of þe eire, bot a cloud of vnknowyng þat is
bitwix þee & þi Godʼ. (34).
My view differs in that I do not think these uses of imagery end with positive
formulations, but that the author follows the three step process laid out in Deonise Hid
Diuinity of affirmation, negation, unknowing. I will address this more closely in the
section titled “ Words Made Flesh: The Incarnation and Denial of Language”, and will
return to the same passage concerning the image of the cloud of unknowing that Taylor
uses.
The significance of constrictive language uses in “Paradox upon Paradox” is that
they “are signs that language can penetrate no further” (40). A prime example Taylor
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uses is the authorʼs talk in Privy Counceling of a “blinde beholdyng”, and when “the
author explains that this ʻblynde werkʼ of the soul is accompanied by ʻa maner of goostly
siʒtʼ” (43). She also further expands on the image of the cloud of unknowing which she
previously suggested the author negates, stating that it is also paradoxical:
[T]he cloud of unknowing is presented paradoxically as an opaque barrier
which is yet a zone of connection. Radicalized in Chapter 68 as a
ʻNothingʼ suddenly discovered to be ʻAllʼ, it combines the drama of literary
paradox with the transcendency of anti-linguistic contemplative paradox.
The Revelation of an abyss of logical contradiction at the heart of the text
reaffirms the metaphorical quality of the many preceding accounts of
working in the cloud, and challenges the reader to move through delusive,
imagination-based knowledge into the truth of ʻgoostliʼ working (44).
This works well as a theory on the method of how The Cloud author uses imagery, but
seems fairly void of anything like a theory of how the author views imagery in general.
For example, there are images that The Cloud author uses that are not paradoxical,
namely the biblical ones of Mary at Christʼs Feet, Moses entering the cloud on Sinai,
and the relation between Moses, Aaron, and Bezaleel. Taylor hardly mentions the
sections of The Cloud concerned with Mary, as the only place her name appears is in a
footnote. Taylor says that the sections of The Cloud that mention Moses entering the
cloud on Sinai “poeticize earlier attempts in The Cloud to articulate the goal of
contemplation” (36). As for the analogy of contemplation with the ark of the covenant,
she hardly does more than point out that The Cloud author uses it as an analogy (36),
and her comments on the passage where the author associates himself with Bezaleel
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and his student with Aaron center mostly around the beginning of that passage where
she says the use of the word “spoken” “confirms the likelihood of mixed oral and written
composition...” and that the passage creates an intimacy in the shared vocation of
contemplation “briefly dissolving the hierarchy of teacher and learner” (39). But overall
there are no comments on the exegetical passages that acknowledge them as uses of
imagery.
Taylor seems to lay out methods of language use–paradox, oxymoron,
constrictive and expansive imagery–which create a theory of language use in The Cloud
only insofar as she proposes that these things mirror the authorʼs negative theology.
And she is right that to the extent that because these images can not be literally known
they do mimic the authorʼs apophatic contemplation, since God can not literally be
known in positive statements. However this does not explain how the author views
imagery so much as how he uses it. One can see that theory is lacking by comparing
her ideas to Englertʼs; his view that the author saw his images as creating a game says
much more about why the author uses images in a negative system. Taylorʼs theory
surpasses Englertʼs in explaining how the author uses images, since her theory of
paradox applies to much more of the authorʼs imagery.
In “Fantasy and Language in The Cloud of Unknowing”, J. A. Burrow relies on a
division in The Cloud between two different types of imagery. He quotes a passage of
The Cloud concerning the imagination, stating that it will portray “sum fantasye, þe
whiche is nouʒt elles bot a bodely conceyte of a goostly þing, or elles a goostly
conseyte of a bodely þing” (117). Through this passage, Burrowʼs analysis of The Cloud
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authorʼs imagery concentrates on respecting the distinction between the bodily and the
ghostly. He writes that:
[T]he implication of the authorʼs double definition seems to be–must be,
indeed–that the physical world has its own necessary and proper integrity
as well as the spiritual world, and that to conceive either world in terms of
the other imperils the integrity of both (289).
The bodily conceits of ghostly things are fairly obvious; these bodily conceits are the
types of imagery that negative theology is warning against as literal interpretations of
spiritual things. One example Burrow gives is when The Cloud author states that while
some people would tell a person to gather everything inside of oneʼs self and worship
God there, The Cloud author says he will not say this–though he does believe it is true–
for fear that his student would have a “bodely conceiving of his wordes”. Instead, the
author commands the contemplative to not be inside himself, nor outside himself. If one
objects and says that then one will be nowhere, the author assures the reader that this
is what he wants, “For whi noʒwhere bodely is euerywhere goostly” (121). In this, the
idea of “inside” is a bodily conceit of a ghostly thing. This warning guards the
contemplative against any bodily striving to internalize efforts while they remain bodily
strivings. Burrow describes the habits of false contemplatives as an example of a
ghostly conceit of a bodily thing:
The author here describes an amusing variety of eccentric habits: wild
gestures, staring eyes, piping voices, gaping mouths, and the like; and he
expresses his disapproval of them in no uncertain terms… Such
ʻunsemely and unordeinde contenauncesʼ (99) are either simple hypocrisy
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or else they derive from the fantasies of the disordered imagination. For
just as spiritual activities can be disturbed by bodily things, so bodily
activity can be disturbed by spiritual things. The attempt to act physically in
a ʻspiritualʼ way leads to absurdity, to madness, or even to damnation
(290).
With examples of these possible confusions, Burrow moves onto the significance of the
mutual dignity of the physical and spiritual worlds, and addresses more directly the role
of language in The Cloud. The problem, as Burrow points out, is that even negative
theology must be expressed and taught with the very language it seeks to avoid. He
quotes what is probably the most important passage in The Cloud for understanding the
authorʼs view of language:
[B]eware þat þou conceyue not bodely þat þat is mente goostly, þof al it be
spokyn in bodely wordes, as ben þees: UP OR DOUN, IN OR OUTE,
BEHINDE OR BEFORE, ON O SIDE OR ON OþER. For þof al þat a þing be
neuer so goostly in it-self, neuerþeles ʒit ʒif it schal be spoken of, siþen it
so is þat speche is a bodely werk wrouʒt wiþ the tonge, þe whiche is an
instrument of þe body, it bohoueþ alweis be spoken in bodely words (114).
This passage is absolutely pivotal to understanding the use of imagery in The Cloud.
The Cloud author wants us to attend wholly to the spiritual, but language by its very
nature is always going to be bodily. Burrow expounds on this passage:
There is therefore no question, for [the author], of escaping into purely
spiritual language. The task is rather to express spiritual things in such a
way that the ʻbodily wordsʼ do not become confused with their spiritual
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referents. To avoid such confusion, it is best that the inevitable physical
imagery should be clearly recognized for what it is: physical (295).
Burrow is exactly right on this point. The author has come to terms with the fact that,
although he wants to talk about the spiritual, speech is a bodily act, and as such can
only express things in bodily terms. Or, as Burrow puts it, “The phrase ʻbodily wordesʼ
has a double meaning here. It refers to language as a physical activity, … and also to
the fact that language expresses things in physical terms” (292). He further states that
“The implication seems to be that the one fact follows from the other: i.e. it is because
language is a physical activity that it can only express ideas in physical terms” (292).
On this point I could not agree with Burrow more, but this is also where I must
depart from him. The issue of language in negative theology is absolutely central, and
while I completely agree with the idea that the author sees the distinction, and respects
the distinction of the bodily and ghostly having their own realms, I think that as a theory
of why the author uses language the way he does it falls short.
The two previous articles, “Ludic Imagery” and “Paradox upon Paradox” tightly
knit The Cloud authorʼs view of language to the fact that he is part of the apophatic
tradition. Both of these seem more intertwined with the text than Burrowʼs, and capture
the nature of the contemplation that The Cloud author is specifically trying to achieve in
his work. However, they do this at the peril of having a theory that is too specific to the
text. This is certainly true of Englert, as an apophatic mystic could easily recognize the
failings of language, yet still attempt to use it in a serious manner, knowing full well that
it will fail, but that it is nonetheless the only method available. Taylorʼs approach is too
specific in that imagery is not of necessity paradoxical, even in negative theology, where
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it can simply be insufficient, but not a paradox. And she doesnʼt give a reason for why
an apophatic contemplative would be so comfortable using imagery so often; he may be
justified in using imagery if it is paradoxical, but why use it at all? For Englert it is
because it is a game; for Burrow because language is innately limited to the physical.
Burrowʼs theory can, without a doubt, be applied to nearly all Christian literature,
apophatic or cataphatic, that has been traditionally considered orthodox. And although
this is a strength of the theory, because it shows its acceptability in a very wide range of
spirituality, the theory seems to fall short of being a specifically apophatic theory of how
the author uses language. It shows the necessity of using images, and the frustrations
that come with trying to talk of spiritual things in negative theology, but it leaves one
feeling unsatisfied because it leaves the physical and spiritual realms so mutually
exclusive, even if they are both necessary. The Cloud author plays with language in a
way that seems to imply a more intimate connection between language and the spiritual
than simply recognizing that language is in the physical sphere while trying to express
that which is in the spiritual realm.
For Burrow to say that The Cloud author is comfortable using imagery because
he accepts it as being physical, and that his remedy for languageʼs physicality is
removing ambiguities through clarification, pushes the divide between the spiritual and
physical too far, because while they are different, they are intertwined. The physical and
the spiritual are not unconnected; the connection is evident from the joined bodily and
ghostly nature of humans. We are bodily, in that we have bodies, and we are ghostly, in
that we have souls. This connection between the spiritual and physical realms is what
my theory of language use in The Cloud is based on. More accurately, though similarly,
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it is based on how the spiritual and physical come together in the doctrine of the
Incarnation. Just as our bodies are a physical component to our soul, in the doctrine of
the Incarnation Christ is the physical manifestation of God. As such, Christ is said to be
the Word of God: the Word made flesh. And this is something all of the previously
mentioned authors leave out. How does the authorʼs view of language within negative
theology affect his reading of Christ as the Word; or perhaps, how does the divine
metaphor of Christ being the Word affect the authorʼs use of language? This is the key a
theology of language that can apply both to apophatic and cataphatic theology alike, as
well as tend specifically to the way language is used in The Cloud of Unknowing.
Christ, as the Word, is a physical manifestation of God. In Genesis God is said to
have spoken the universe into existence. Both of these show how there could be
ghostly conceits that, through the speech act, are forced into the bodily realm: language
is an incarnational act.
II. Words Made Flesh:
The Incarnation and Denial of Language
Imaginative language is an incarnation of that which it seeks to express. The
Cloud author lays down his theory that all language is physical when he writes:
For þof al þat a þing be neuer so goostly in it-self, neuerþeles ʒit ʒif it schal
be spoken of, siþen it so is þat speche is a bodely werk wrouʒt wiþ the
tonge, þe whiche is an instrument of þe body, it bohoueþ alweis be spoken
in bodely words (114).
No matter how spiritual a thing is, because speech is a bodily work, the speech act
always brings it into the bodily realm. What I mean when I say language is incarnational

29

is that words are physical manifestations of what they are representing; I rely both on
the above account from the author that all spoken things are bodily, as well as the divine
speech act–the Word of God–which is Christ, who is God made physical. The act of
incarnation creates a bond between the thing being spoken of, which can be entirely
ghostly, and what is spoken about it, which is always entirely physical. The bond created
is how language can refer to that which it is manifesting, and this is particularly true of
imaginative language.
In the closing of the last chapter I referred to two of Godʼs speech acts: Christ as
The Word, and the creation in Genesis. These seem to be of two different types. Christ
is “the image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15), while the creation is a speaking of things
into existence, but not necessarily the creation of an image. I am interested in the
former, as my concern is with The Cloudʼs imaginative language. Perhaps nonimaginative language can be related more to the creation event, but that is outside the
scope of this paper. But it is something I wanted to address as I will explore the theory
of incarnational language wholly inside the realm of imaginative language. In addition,
since the scholarship addressing The Cloud authorʼs use of imagery is thoroughly
covered in the two previous sections, this chapter with concentrate almost wholly on
setting up the incarnational theory of language that I am proposing, with only brief
mentions of the previously mentioned scholars to further show how my work fits in with
the existing theories.
In chapter fifty-five The Cloud author gives an example other than Christ of what I
mean when I say that language is incarnational. He discusses angels and devils
appearing to humans in forms that represent their spiritual selves, or their mission:
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Þe deuil is a spirit, & of his owne kynde he haþ no body more þen an
aungele. Bot ʒit neuerþeles, what tyme þat he or an aungele schal take
any bodi by leue of God to maak any mynistracion to any man in þis liif: al
after þe werk is þat he schal mynistre, þer-after in licnes is þe qualite of
his body in some party (102).
Immediately following this he gives an example which he appears to take as real life,
and not simply a metaphor. He says that some necromancers say that the devil will
appear with a single large nostril, which he tries to entice humans to look into to see his
brain, which is the fire of hell. The author explains that this single nostril represents a
lack of discretion. This is an example of what I have in mind when I say that language is
incarnational. First, that language is a bodily representation of something ghostly.
Secondly, that through manifesting themselves in a physical manner, the images take
on characteristics of that which they are manifesting. Sometimes it is as simple as a
name, and sometimes it is a trait like a single nostril and a brain made of the hell fire.
The author has already established that he views all speech acts as bodily, and I intend
to show how his images are used to manifest some characteristic of the idea that they
are expressing. The resemblance between things expressed and the imagery
expressing them, as well as the notion that all language is physical, and that the
incarnation of God is called The Word, are my arguments that language is incarnational.
While this is relatively simple when it comes to the theory of how the author views
language, it is important that this makes a connection between speech and Christ. As I
also lay out the way in which The Cloud author negates language according to the three
step process of affirmation, negation, and unknowing set forth in Deonise Hid Diuinity,
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this connection will enable me to explore how the authorʼs view and method of language
use influence his reading of Christ within negative theology. The connection between
Christ and language is extremely circular in that both elements mutually inform each
other.
If viewed under the hierarchy of possible predications put forth in Deonise Hid
Diuinity, The Cloud authorʼs images fit in with the lowest and largest group of
predicates, which are the last to be affirmed, and the first to be negated. These images
make an analogy between God and pretty much any earthly thing, whether one saying
that God made on oath, or saying that God is drunk. The imagery that The Cloud author
creates is all low level imagery of this type, and because of this it is the first to be
negated in negative theology, and the author can negate them as soon as he makes
them. Through these images the author mimics the affirmation, denial, unknowing
process of negative theology.
A natural starting point is with the eponymous central image of a cloud of
unknowing. The Cloud author writes of oneʼs first endeavor into contemplation:
For at þe first tyme when þou dost it, þou fyndest bot a derknes, & as it
were a cloude of vnknowing, þou wost neuer what, sauyng þat þou felist in
þi wille a nakid entent vnto God. Þis derknes & þis cloude is, how-so-euer
þou dost, bitwix þee & þi God (17).
The creation of an image is the first act in the series of how language reflects negative
theology; one needs an affirmation before one is able to negate it. The affirmation is the
initial incarnational act of the image. Here we have a spiritual idea manifested through
words, thus making it physical, which the reader receives and constructs as a mental
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image. The author gives his imagery in no uncertain or weak words by writing that the
experience is ʻkind of likeʼ darkness, and ʻkind of likeʼ a cloud; he directly says one will
find “bot a derknes”, and that “ Þis derknes & þis cloude is, how-so-euer þou dost, bitwix
þee & þi God”. They are not like a darkness and a cloud, but they are a darkness and a
cloud. It is also noteworthy that the author actually presents two images, one is a
darkness, the other a cloud. The use of two images shows the flexibility of the author;
he is not committed to just one of them. There is something that an image of darkness
and an image of a cloud share, and that is what the author is interested in. This shows
how free the images are, and that they can be related to the most common type of
image under Pseudo-Dionysiusʼs schema of descending affirmational statements.
While The Cloud is an apophatic work, cataphatic theology is still a prominent
part of the process. This is evident from the authorʼs prologue, where he demands that
the reader is well acquainted with and dedicated to Christ, as well as his demands
throughout The Cloud that, before embarking on apophatic contemplation, one should
contemplate the goodness of God, and the mercy of the Passion of Christ. Just as
Christ makes a connection with God possible for humanity through the Incarnation,
imagery allows access to the contemplation which it incarnates. In Deonise Hid Diuinity
there is an image relating negative theology to sculpting (6). A sculptor has a piece of
stone. The stone, as a big hunk of physical material, is like an affirmation. It gives the
sculptor something to work with. But the sculptor makes the image by gradually
removing pieces of stone–like a series of denials. One is left with a type of knowing, if I
may call it such, which comes from denials. It is an unknowing, or, in the theology of
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The Cloud, it is fully grasping God through love rather than the intellect. The sculpting
image is a metaphor (an incarnation) of the process of negative theology.
By creating the image of the cloud of unknowing, and of entering a darkness, the
author is showing the reader the stone he plans on working with–his affirmation. To get
to the ghostly understanding hidden within the bodily stone the author must work his
craft of carving off pieces of stone. The pieces he removes are different readings–literal
readings–of his image. This is his denial:
& wene not, for I clepe it a derknes or a cloude, þat it be any cloude
congelid of þe humours þat fleen in þe ayre, ne ʒit any derkness soche as
is in þin house on niʒtes, when þi candel is oute. For soche a derknes &
soche a cloude maist þou ymagin wiþ coriiouste of witte, for to bere before
þin iʒen in þe liʒtest day of somer ; & also aʒensward in þe derkist niʒt of
wynter þou mayst ymagin a clere schinyng liʒt. Lat be soche falsheed ; I
mene not þus. For when I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng ; as
alle þat þing þat þou knowest not, or elles þat þou hast forʒetyn, it is derk
to þee, for þou seest it not wiþ þi goostly iʒe. & for þis skile it is not clepid
a cloude of þe eire, bot a cloude of vnknowyng, þat is bitwix þee & þi God
(23).
This is the first passage in which the author provides one of his clarifications, and a
denial of the image he has given his reader. In this second step of negative theology the
author has carved away the literal reading of his image, and left the reader with the final
stage of a ghostly understanding. As physical darkness is a lack of light, this ghostly
darkness is a lack of knowing; and as a physical cloud blocks oneʼs view by coming
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between the person and the sun, this ghostly cloud of unknowing blocks understanding
of the intellect by coming between the person and God.
The act of denial makes the authorʼs use of metaphor over a comparison or
simile important. He puts forth the image as something definite–it is a cloud, it is a
darkness–before negating the literal reading so that it remains a cloud and a darkness,
but not a literal one of either. There is a darkness and a cloud, but they are ghostly, not
bodily. If he simply said the experience is like a darkness, it would be enough to say “but
it is also not like a darkness because you can imagine a candle even on the darkest
winter night”. The authorʼs point is that it actually is a darkness and a cloud; however it
is a ghostly darkness and cloud, which doesnʼt make it less of either, but only different
from the types of clouds and darknesses that we interact with. That the author does not
want to lose this initial affirmation is evident from a passage in Deonise Hid Diuinity
where he writes:
It behoutþ us for to sette, for to see, & for to afferme alle þe settynges &
þe beynges of alle þees beyng þinges in him þat is abouen al knowyng &
mynde, as hym being þe cause of alle þees þynges ; and more propirly &
more miʒtely for to denye alle þees being þinges, as hym souereinly
beyng abouen hem alle, ful heiʒ in hymself, departid fro hem alle ; and not
for to haue it in opinyon þat þees deniinges of þees being þinges ben
contrary to þe first afermynges of hem, bot fastliche for to holde in siʒt of
byleue him for to be abouen alle doyng awey of þees beyng or beable
þinges, þe whiche in himself is abouen alle, ʒe! boþe doyng awey and
affermyng of hem alle (4).
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If in negative theology the denial does not do away with the initial affirmation, then when
the author denies his images, in parallel to the process of negative theology, he does
not do away with the initial affirmation. The author wants the non-literal image to remain
because without the affirmation there is nothing to negate; without the stone the sculptor
would be left with nothing to sculpt. Few people, if any, would be impressed with a
sculptor, or learn anything from a sculptor, that showed an uncarved block of stone only
to take the whole thing out of the room and exclaim “ta-da!” That would be equivalent to
completely removing the image, or to saying nothing at all; and saying nothing is
different from denying cataphatic statements. The author wants one to leave all prior
knowledge behind in a cloud of forgetting for the purposes of contemplation, but he
does not want one to enter contemplation without first knowing Christ and dedicating
oneʼs life to him, nor to be unable to return to these cataphatic statements when one is
not engaging in contemplation. Recall that the author affirms many statements about
God, Christ, and the church while he is writing, but leaves all of these behind the cloud
of forgetting while contemplating.
In the previous example the author uses two images, showing that he is not
particularly committed to a single one, but that a multiplicity of images are available to
him. This resembles the lowest level of images in Pseudo-Dionysiusʼs hierarchy, which
is the most populated, because these images relate God to purely natural and physical
things, such as sleeping, or anger. This next example further exhibits that the authorʼs
images relate to this low imagery. In the next image the author creates an image which
is an incarnation of the attempt to overcome distractions that come between the
contemplative and God. The author writes of distractions:

36

fonde to loke as it were ouer þeire schuldres, seching anoþer þing: þe
whiche þing is God, enclosid in a cloude of vnknowyng. … þis sleiʒt be
wel & trewly conceyuid, it is not elles bot a longing desire vnto God, to fele
hym & see hym as it may be here (66).
The author encourages the contemplative to try to look over the shoulder of oneʼs
distractions, and attempt to see the cloud of unknowing which contains The Divine. By
speaking the image it is made incarnate. It is also denied when the author restricts the
reading by carving away the literal interpretation in saying that looking over the
distractionʼs shoulder is nothing else but a longing desire for God. One is left with the
unknowing of a method for dealing with distractions.
The second image in this passage is suggested if the first does not work. In this
case the author suggests that one:
koure þou doun under hem as a cheitif & a coward ouercomen in batayle,
& þink þat it is bot foly to þee to styue any lenger wiþ hem ; & þerfore þou
ʒeeldest þee to God in þe handes of þin enmyes. … & sekirly, me þink, &
þis sleiʒt be sotely conceyuid, it is not elles bot a trewe knowyng & a
felyng of þi-selef as þou arte, a wrecche & a filþe, fer wers þen nouʒt: þe
whiche knowyng & felyng is meeknes (67).
The incarnate image here is of the helplessness of the contemplative to make any
progress in overcoming distractions without the help of grace. The author suggests that
one throw oneʼs self down like a coward in battle who knows it would be folly to fight any
longer, and therefore yield oneʼs self to the mercy of God. And, in his fashion, the author
also sculpts away his denial in the passage, indicating that this surrenderʼs meaning is
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spiritual. It embodies a recognition of oneʼs own sinfulness before The Divine. It is not a
literal throwing down of oneʼs physical body, but a throwing down of oneʼs ghostly body.
The fact that two images are presented for the same purpose shows the
connection between these images and the low sort of image. However, here the author
goes even beyond two images and invites the contemplative to create new methods of
overcoming distractions. He exhorts the reader to avoid distractions “in þe maner
beforeseid, or betyr ʒif þou betyr mayst” (68, emphasis mine). By inviting the reader to
create oneʼs own method and oneʼs own image, the lowest image type is implied, as it is
the area where pretty much anything goes. Not only are most images acceptable in this
sphere, but, since they are the first of the things predicated to The Divine to be denied,
one need not hesitate in denying them. This approach sheds light on The Cloud
authorʼs method and why he is comfortable using imagery. Language is incarnational;
therefore it embodies spiritual significance in a physical manner, and a legitimate one,
as Christ was an incarnation and is certainly seen as legitimate. However, this by itself
is not a good enough reason in the apophatic tradition, which seeks to know by
unknowing. The justification for The Cloud author to use imagery is the speed ease
ease with which one can deny the lowest sort of images. Therefore the image does not
commit him to the literal reading of it; since language is always physical, using these
low images gives him the ability to quickly and easily deny what he has created–to chip
away at his block of physical stone with denials, thus creating a spiritual unknowing.
And the fact that he invites the reader to partake in the image making shows that the
images he is using are of the lowest kind, and that there can be a plethora of these
types of images. Any higher type of image in the same realm as a statement such as
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“God is life” takes more care to deny because it is in a sense truer, but the lower images
can be denied immediately, and even during the creation of the image. If one combineʼs
the incarnational view with Englertʼs theory, these images, which are game-like, are
incarnations of what the author is attempting and one can view them as toys–
incarnations of the game. One can play with the toy of looking over shoulders, or put
that toy away and play with throwing oneʼs self down like a coward in battle. Of course
this is done in a very serious manner, and I do not mean that they are literal toys, but
they are spiritual devices that act as tools in the process of contemplation, which in
relation to Englert may be interpreted as toys.
The imaginative language that the author is the most cautious of is directional
language. Because the author is so nervous of this type of imagery it provides an
opportunity to bring out another point of the method and theory of language use in The
Cloud. The authorʼs directional imagery shows that he is careful not only in his denials
of the literal meanings of his images, but also in his constructions of affirmations; he
sculpts with only the proper stone. The author often provides a denial of his images
which is separate from their affirmation, but he also has denials within some of the
images themselves. In “Paradox upon Paradox” Taylor sees this as the creation of
paradox to restrict the reading–which it is, but more accurately it exhibits both the
incarnational nature of language, as well as the authorʼs method of affirmation and
denial, which leads to a spiritual unknowing.
In another example of the authorʼs anxiety about directional imagery, the author
explains why he uses the image and advice that one should hide oneʼs desire from God
rather than show it:
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paraunture, & I had boden þee schewe vnto God þe steryng of þin herte,
þou schuldest haue maad a bodily schewyng vnto hym, ouþer in
contenaunce, or in voyce, or in worde, or in som oþer rude bodely
streynyng, as it is when þou schalt schewe a þing tat is hid in þinhert to a
bodely man ; & in as moche þi werk schuld haue ben inpure. For on o
maner schal a þing be schewid to man, & on an-oþer maner vnto God
(90).
The author is worried that if he said to show oneʼs desire, because showing has a
connotation with an outward direction, one might strive with oneʼs physical body. But in
this same chapter the author argues that to bring oneʼs desire into the depth of oneʼs
spirit is a better way to show things to God, because if it is put more into our spirit it is
removed more from bodily things, and therefore in the part of us that is spirit, as God is
spirit. Not that God would really be able to see our desire any more clearly, since The
Divine sees all with perfect clarity, but because by bringing it into our spirit it is closer to
God. This shows the careful way in which the denial of the image can be present in the
imageʼs incarnation; to show oneʼs desire to God by hiding it can have no literal
interpretation.
Because of the authorʼs fear of misinterpreting directional language, he concerns
himself specifically with the interpretation of prepositions. In regards to the preposition
“in”, the author advises where he wants one to be during contemplation:
& on þe same maner, wher anoþer man wolde bid þee gader þi miʒtes &
þi wittes holiche wiþ-inne þi-self, & worschip God þere–þof al he sey ful
wel & ful trewly, ʒe! & no man trewlier & he be wel conseiuid–ʒit for feerde
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of disseite & bodely conceyuyng of his wordes, me list not byd þee do so.
Bot þus wil i bid þee. Loke on no wyse þat þou be wiþ-inne þi-self. &
schortly wiþ-outyn þi-self wil I not þat þou be, ne ʒit abouen, ne be-hynde,
no on o side, ne on oþer. ʻWher þan,ʼ seist þou ʻshall I be? Noʒwhere, by
þi tale!ʼ Now trewly þou seist wel ; for þere wolde I haue þee. For whi
noʒwhere bodely is euerywhere goostly (121).
Rather than risk using the word “in” the author would rather tell the contemplative to be
nowhere, because nowhere bodily is everywhere spiritually. As in all instances of
language, the author gives the reader an incarnation of a ghostly idea. Though here the
physicality of the image is almost entirely due to the fact that it is spoken rather than the
image itself representing something physical. The image demands denial of anything
like a literal reading, and thus it negates itself upon affirmation, and the reader is left
with the ghostly understanding that in contemplation one must be nowhere, so that one
can spiritually be everywhere. The inability to have a literal interpretation ensures that
the image will not be misunderstood. If one is nowhere bodily then one need not worry
about distractions, and certainly one can not misinterpret this and actually try to be
nowhere bodily. But if the author were to follow common practice and say to direct oneʼs
worship inward, the contemplative could perhaps exert great effort attempting to make
everything internal in a more physical sense, when the image the author is sculpting is
intended for spiritual direction. There is also an important indication in the above
passage of the authorʼs acceptance of cataphatic statements when he writes that if one
says to worship God inside oneʼs self it is said “ful wel & ful trewly”. The Cloud author
accepts otherʼs images, but he simply prefers to use more precise imagery that will not
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allow his reader to go astray. Although his imagery is of the lowest type, he wants it to
be precise, and as something that is an incarnation, he wants the image to be a good
representation of that which it is incarnating.
As part of the incarnational act the author takes the time to consider how the
physical part of imagery affects the spiritual meaning, and the relation between the two.
This is evident in his treatment of the spiritual meaning of the prepositions used in the
ascension of Christ. The author responds to the objection that the ascension was not
just spiritual, but that Christ ascended bodily, giving evidence that heaven is upwards,
and that therefore one should literally direct oneʼs mind upwards during prayer. He says
that it was not necessary for Christ to ascend in order to get closer to heaven, since up
is no closer than any other direction, but that it is simply the most seemly:
Ensumple herof may be seen by þe assencion of oure Lorde ; for whan þe
tyme statute was icomen þat him likyd to weende to his Fader bodely in
his Manheed–þe whiche was neuer, ne neuer may be, absent in his
Godheed–þan miʒtely, by þe vertewe of þe Spirit God, þe Manheed wiþ þe
body folowed in onheed of Persone. Þe visibilite of þis was moste seemly
& most acordyng to be upward (113).
Christ did not need to go up, and physically ascending did not actually assist him in
getting to heaven, but he had to leave somehow, and, if he is going to leave, then
ascending upwards seems to be the most meaningful action: the image Christ is
physically creating, with his body rather than words, is a physical manifestation–an
incarnation–of the spiritual event of his return to the Father. Similarly one might lift up
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oneʼs hands in prayer, but it is a bodily representation of a spiritual lifting. The Cloud
author writes of such actions:
Neuerþeles it is needful to lifte up oure iʒen & oure hondes bodely, as it
were vnto ʒone bodely heuen, in þe whiche þe elementes ben fastnid. I
mene ʒif we ben sterid of þe werk of oure spirit, & elles nouʒt. For alle
bodely þing is sogette vnto goostly þing & is reulid þerafter, & not
aʒensward (112-113).
Since the spiritual is directing our prayer towards heaven, one may feel called by the
work of oneʼs spirit to raise oneʼs hands and eyes physically as a bodily representation
of what one is doing spiritually. But if one does this one must recognize that it is
representing something spiritual, and the physical motions are not ends in themselves.
The image of the incarnation begins to present a new type of imagery:
exegetical. These images differ from the others in that Christ actually did ascend, and
their literal reading carries some truth to it. But the author is often not interested in what
literally happened in the biblical passages he examines. Rather, he is interested in the
spiritual significance of each passage, and in this sense, these images are also
incarnations of a ghostly meaning much like the images that the author creates himself.
And the author fully intends to analyze the passages as such, and even continue to
deny the literal reading.
Finally, the author treats the biblical story of Mosesʼs encounter with God, which
produced the ark of the covenant. The author identifies two types of contemplatives: the
first must toil long and hard before temporarily and rarely reaching the perfection of
contemplation, perhaps only in occasional ravishings; the other kind seems to enter into
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the perfection of contemplation whenever desired, whether walking, sitting, standing,
kneeling, or anything else. The first he relates to Moses who had to toil to climb the
mountain and enter the cloud where he was given the design of the ark. Aaron is like
the second, who, because he was a priest, was able to see the ark whenever he
pleased. The ark is the gift of contemplation:
& weel is þis grace & þis werk licnid to þat arke. For riʒt as in þat arke
were contenid alle þe juelles & þe relikies of þe temple, riʒt so in þis lityl
loue put ben contenid alle þ vetewes of mans soule, þe whiche is þe
ghoostly temple of God (126).
If the cloud that the contemplative is to enter is the same cloud as Moses, and the
contemplative is to have access to the ark of the covenant, then these biblical images
can not be read literally since the ark is lost, and the contemplative is not at Sinai with
Moses. Despite this, the cloud that Moses entered is the same cloud that the
contemplative has been invited to enter throughout the entire work; the story from
Exodus is the motivation for the authorʼs choice of a cloud as the image of God in
apophatic contemplation. So while Moses did literally ascend Sinai and enter into a
cloud, one can not read this story literally if one seeks to apply it to oneʼs life. Instead,
one must take the image and read it metaphorically; one must put the physical aspect of
the image behind the cloud of forgetting, and enter into a direct and spiritual interaction
with the incarnational image that one is using.
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III. Flesh Made Metaphor
1. The Non-Literal Reading of Christ
It is through apophatic denial that one can encounter God in the biblical images
of Christ, leaving the literal reading behind and entering into an interaction with the
image. The Cloud author illustrates this in his exegesis of the encounter of Mary and
Martha. The author recounts the passage and provides a reading that presents Mary as
an archetype of contemplatives:
In þe Gospel of Seinte Luke it is wretyn þat when oure Lourde was in þe
hous of Martha hir sister, al þe tyme þat Martha maad hir besy aboute þe
diʒtyng of his mete, Mary hir sister sat at his feet. & in heryng of his worde,
sche beheeld not to þe besines of hir sister, þof al hir besines was ful good
& ful holy, for it is þe first party of actyue liif ; ne ʒit to the preciouste of his
blessid body, ne to þe swete voyce & þe wordes of his manheed, þof al it
be beter & holier, for it is þe secound party of actyue liif & þe first of
contemplatye liif, bot to þe souereyneest wisdom of his Godheed lappid in
þe derk wordes of his Manheed: þeder beheeld sche wiþ al þe loue of hir
hert. For fro þens list hir not remowe for noþing þat sche saw ne herde
spoken ne done aboute hur ; bot sat ful stille in hir body, wiþ many a swete
priue & a lysty loue put upon þat hiʒe cloude of vnknowyng bitwix hir & hir
God (47).
While Martha is busy with the business of active life, Mary sits at the feet of the Godman. She is oblivious to everything going on around her, and, as the author later notes,
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does not even defend herself against her sisterʼs complaints. She has pushed all earthly
things into the cloud of forgetting. This includes the humanity of Christ. Even though
paying attention to Christʼs blessed body, and sweet voice and words would be good,
such activities are only the first part of the contemplative life, and Mary is engaged in
the highest form of contemplation. She is only paying attention to the highest wisdom of
his Godhead, which is wrapped in the dark words of his humanity. She is only interested
in being lost in love, looking past the humanity of Christ, and onto The Divine.
Mary sets a precedent for the activity of apophatic contemplation. She is used as
an exemplar of contemplation through the scriptural image of contemplating Christʼs
divinity–an image that is an incarnation of what the contemplative should be. The
contemplative seeks to encounter The Divine, a connection between humanity and God
that Christ made possible for everyone through the Passion and Resurrection, just as
his literal presence made it possible for Mary. But like the cloud that Moses entered, one
can not literally be with Mary at the feet of Christ. As one metaphorically enters the
cloud on Sinai, one must also metaphorically sit at the feet of Christ. This ghostly
reading of the text, that, like Mary, one can also sit at the feet of Christ, is the type of
reading that the contemplative is interested in. When using these images to assist in
contemplation the contemplative must leave behind the literal reading of the image in a
denial, and enter into a completely spiritual reading of the text. Mary did sit at the feet of
Christ, but the contemplative is interested in Mary as an example, and interested in
Christ for his Divinity rather than his literal body. This is the connection between the
image of God, Christ, as the Word, and images produced with actual words. Just as
Mary sat at the feet of the image of God, and looked past the literal image and
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contemplated the ghostly understanding of Christʼs divinity, the contemplative is to look
past any literal reading of the images that The Cloud author creates and contemplate
the imageʼs ghostly meaning. To say “look past the literal word, which is a bodily
manifestation of a ghostly thing, and contemplate the ghostly meaning of that image”,
can equally be said of Christ and of the images created by The Cloud author. The
relation between Christ and imaginative language makes sense of how The Cloud of
Unknowing understands the legitimacy of repeatedly using imagery in an apophatic
work, as well as how one is to approach the Incarnation of God within the apophatic
tradition. One first accepts the initial affirmation, which is an image; one then denies the
literal interpretation of the image, seeking instead the ghostly understanding; and lastly
through this affirmation and denial one reaches an unknowing where a greater bond not
within the power of the intellect is created between the contemplative and God.
The result is that in contemplation Christ must be read metaphorically. One can
not literally sit at his feet, but one must sit at his feet; Christʼs ascension did not literally
help him get to Heaven, but was to symbolize his return to the Father, and the symbolic
motion most appropriate for such an action is an upward motion. While Christ did
literally walk the Earth, and his actual Passion and Resurrection did offer salvation to
humanity, in order to have individual meaning to the contemplative seeking to encounter
The Divine all encounters with the Word of God must be treated in the same manner as
imaginative language. The Cloud author makes this clear in his treatment of the visions
of Saint Martin and Saint Stephen:
For þat þat þei sey of Seynte Martyn & of Seinte Steuen, þor al þei soche
þinges wiþ þeire bodely iʒen, it was schewyd bot in myracle & in certefiing
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of þing þat was goostly. For wite þei ryʒt wel þat Seynte Martyn mantel
come neuer on Crystes owne body substancyaly, for no nede þat he had
þerto to kepe him for coulde ; bot by miracle & in licnes for alle us þat ben
abel to be sauid, þat ben onyd to þe body of Criste goostly. & who-so
cloþeþ a pore man & doþ any oþer good deed for Goddes loue, bodily or
goostly, & þei schul be rewardid as substancyaly þerfore as þei had done
it to Cristes owne body. Þus seiþ hym-self in þe Gospel. ...Alle þe
reuelacions þat euer sawe any man here in bodily licnes in þis liif, þei
haue goostly bemenynges (107).
The author notes that Saint Martinʼs cloak was never actually on the physical body of
Christ, as if Christ still needs protection from cold. Rather, Christ gave Saint Martin this
vision as a miracle to back the understanding of the saying from the gospels that if one
does a good deed for the lowest person, Christ counts it as an act of goodness to
himself.7 The Cloud author confirms that all bodily visions are given for their spiritual
meaning and edification. He offers the experience of Saint Stephenʼs martyrdom as
another example:
sekirly he schewid him not vnto Seynte Steuen bodily in heuen foþi þat he
wolde ʒeue us ensample þat we schuld in oure goostly werk loke bodely
up into heuen. ʒif we mouʒt se hym as Seynte Steuen did, ouþer
stondyng, sittyng, or liggyng. For how-so his body is in heuen–stongyng,
sittyng, of ligging–wote no man. & it nediþ not to be wetyn... but þat he is
þere as him list, & haþ him in body as moste semely is vnto hym for to be.

7

Mt 25:32-46
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For ʒif he schewid him liggyng, or stondyng, or sittyng, by reuelacion
bodely to any creature in þis liif, it is done for sum goostly bemenyng, &
not for no maner of bodely beryng þat he haþ in heuen (109).
Any encounter that one has with Christ is not for any literal or bodily significance, but is
all meant spiritually. The author goes on to explain that Christ standing signifies his
readiness to help, just as when one says to a friend “Iʼll stand by you”, that person is
expressing a willingness to support the friend. Christ specifically showed this to Saint
Stephen as a message to all martyrs to stay strong because he will be there to help
them. The author concludes the section repeating “& þus maist þou se þat þees bodely
schewynges were done by goostly bemenynges” (109). The significance of all physical
showings is spiritual, just as the significance of all of the images that The Cloud author
creates is spiritual. The author insists on this realization through denying the literal
interpretation of images and favoring the spiritual.
In The Cloud of Unknowing the author is always careful in the transition from
affirmation to denial, making sure that the denial of the bodily meaning is explicit, and
that the spiritual meaning is what the contemplative is interested in. In the authorʼs later
work, Privy Counseling, the author is more confident in his readersʼ ability to understand
that the meaning of all images is spiritual, and he makes the transition seamlessly. This
passage from Privy Counseling makes clear that readings of Christ should be taken
spiritually rather than literally in the contemplative work:
Take good gracyous God as he is, plat & pleyn as a plastre, & legge it to þi
seek self as þou art. Or, ʒif I oþer-wise schal say, bere up þi seek self as
þou arte & fonde for to touche bi desire good gracious God as he is, þe
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touching of whome is eendeles helþe by witnes of þe womman in þe
gospel: … ʻIf I touche bot þe hemme of his cloþing, I shal be saaf.ʼ Miche
more schalt þou þan be maad hole of þi seeknes for þis heiʒe heuenly
touching of his owne beyng, him owne dere self (138-139).
Just as the woman in the gospel sought heeling by touching the garment of Christ, the
author directly relates this to a reaching out and touching of The Divineʼs self. Because
one can no longer reach out to touch the physical Christ, one must reach out with desire
to touch God. The denial is subtle, but it is there in the specification that one must reach
out “bi desire” rather than with oneʼs hand. All interactions with Christ must be
understood spiritually. In the contemplative work the literal interpretation of visions,
images, and Christ are all denied, and one is left only with a spiritual understanding that
results from unknowing.
2. The Self Denial of Christ
To this point it has been illustrated how language is incarnational and imitates the
process of negative theology consisting of affirmation, denial, and unknowing, as well as
how The Cloud approaches images and Christ in the same manner. In support of the
view that Christ must always be read metaphorically, this section will demonstrate how
the life of Christ independently parallels the process of negative theology, much as The
Cloud authorʼs language use.
As with instances of language, the affirmation of Christ is through an
incarnational act–more specifically, the Incarnation. In the Incarnation The Divine made
an affirmation about The Divine. The affirmation was an image in the form of a human.
The image was a walking talking affirmation that was not just a representation of The
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Divine, but an incarnation that was an actual physical instantiation of The Divine. This is
the first step in the process of negative theology. It is also the key to cataphatic
theology. In affirmative theology Christ is the surest way that one can know anything
about God. As Pseudo-Dionysius explains, the apophatic denial does not do away with
the initial affirmation, the Incarnation is also important to negative theology. It remains
true that the literal Christ made unification with The Divine possible through salvation.
But in the work of contemplation, one must deny the literal Christ, and sit at his feet
contemplating his divinity rather than attending to his humanity.
The second step in the apophatic process is the denial, where one denies the
affirmation in order to reach the third step of a state of unknowing and a closer proximity
to God. The denial must not do away with the initial affirmation, but show that there is
more to it than one thought–it can not contain the whole truth. Christ exhibits his self
denial though his Passion, and Resurrection. (By which I do not mean self-denial, but
performing an apophatic denial of himself.) The Passion and Resurrection form the
moment when the literal interpretation of Christ is denied. One can no longer see the
Nazarene as a mere human–he has died, and overcome death. The bodily presence of
Jesus is denied in the Passion; in the Resurrection one sees that what is left is the
spiritual interpretation of Jesus as the Christ. Like The Cloud authorʼs images, the literal
interpretation is restricted to bring out the spiritual understanding of the image. The one
difference is that the images The Cloud author creates are made of words, whereas this
image–Christ, the Word–is made of flesh.
The final step of the apophatic reading of Christʼs life is entering into unknowing.
After the affirmation and denial, one should be left with a deeper connection to God.
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Christ fulfills this at Pentecost, by keeping his promise of sending the Paraclete. The
reception of the Holy Spirit is the stage of unknowing, and the unification with The
Divine that one strives for in contemplation. The affirmation was made in the
incarnation, and through the denial of the Passion and Ressurection the literal presence
of Christ had to be removed, but just as the unknowing of contemplation does not leave
the contemplative a fool who knows nothing, the absence of Christ does not leave the
earthly church empty, but rather more full thanks to the Holy Spirit.
Within Christianity the preparation and celebration of these important events in
the life of Christ form the entire basis of the Christian liturgical year. The year begins
with Advent and Christmas, celebrating the affirmation made through the Incarnation.
After a brief period come the seasons of Lent and Easter, mourning the death and
celebrating the resurrection of Christ. This double natured state of mourning and
celebrating is appropriate in representing the apophatic denial. One is losing the literal
body of Christ, and The Cloud author repeatedly reminds his audience that the body
and literal presence of Christ is a good thing not to be scorned. But his body is not part
of the work of the contemplative. On Good Friday Christians confront the pain of leaving
the physical Christ behind. But like the contemplative, one looks forward to the ultimate
result of the denial, which will bring one closer to God than the affirmation could have.
This is fulfilled in the Easter Celebration. Because Christ overcame death, one begins to
see the advantage that comes from the denial as the resurrection creates the possibility
of eternal life for all. Lastly the Easter season ends with Pentecost, where the Holy Spirit
enters the life of the Christian community as a way to remain spiritually connected to
God in the absence of the bodily Christ. Here the reception of the Holy Spirit is the
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stage of unknowing, where one is left with a denial of the physical interpretation of the
image–the bodily form of Christ–and in that denial enters a completely spiritual
connection. This is also the point where the major period of the liturgical year known as
Ordinary Time begins. The name ʻordinaryʼ implies that it is the normal routine of things,
which fits well with the fact that in a literal sense the Christian is now living in a time
where the spiritual presence in his or her life is the Holy Spirit as opposed to the
physical presence of Christ. Ordinary Time is where one functions in unknowing, left
with a denial of the physical and an immersion in The Spirit.
These major events in the life of Christ–Incarnation; Passion, and Resurrection;
and the arrival of the Holy Spirit–are at the foundation of important Christian doctrines,
as well as the holidays that define the liturgical year. It is through these events that one
sees how the life of Christ, like the use of imagery in The Cloud, participates in the
pattern of negative theology. When viewed in conjunction with how The Cloud instructs
one to treat imagery and Christ, it becomes apparent that the key to understanding The
Cloud authorʼs use of imagery, as well as the role he assigns to Christ in contemplation,
are found in each other.
IV. Conclusion
The independent evidence that both The Cloud authorʼs use of imagery and the
life of Christ mirror the process of apophatic negation, along with the demonstration that
The Cloud of Unknowing expects the contemplative to approach imagery and Christ in a
similar manner of looking past the literal word/Word and onto the spiritual significance,
creates a coherent explanation of The Cloud authorʼs use of imaginative language as
well as the role of the God-man in negative theology.
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Besides adequately explaining language use in The Cloud, and how language
relates to the metaphor of Christ as The Word, a chief benefit of the incarnational theory
of language is that one need not abandon what other scholars have said. The playful
nature of some of The Cloudʼs images is undeniable, and it remains; the author does
take great care to reaffirm the mutual dignity of both the physical and spiritual, and
acknowledges that language is by necessity physical; and the author certainly creates
images that are paradoxical. None of this has to be left behind under the incarnational
view.
A final consideration is that one can not neglect the fact that this paper is itself a
speech act, and that language as an incarnation is itself an image. In addition to being
an image, this paperʼs meaning is at least partially ghostly. While all language is
physical and therefore similar to the Incarnation of Christ, the primary significance of
languageʼs incarnational nature is that it creates a connection between Christ and
speech acts. It shows how Christ affects The Cloud authorʼs view of language, and how
his view of language affects his understanding of Christ. Because of this, the literal
interpretation of language being incarnational must be denied, though without removing
the initial affirmation. One must first accept the affirmation that language is
incarnational. Then, one must deny it due to its physical nature, and through this denial
attempt to realize that this physical speech act is insufficient in understanding what the
metaphor of Christ as the Word, or how his status as the Word relates to apophatic
theologyʼs avoidance of language. After an apophatic denial of the image of language
as incarnational one is left with knowing its relevance through unknowing.
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